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: : Try Dennett's 'The Origins of ytic Philosophy' chapter 7. : : I don't think Frege would have agreed that there is an intersubjective charector of the word I. : : Rather there is an indexical charector. No : w, in an ideal language, a sense is fixed to one referent. Hence a sense always has one truth value (since referent is truth value). So indexical cases show that a sense (or thought for a sentence) cannot be a sense of eg 'I like ice cream' taken as a type of sentence, but only 'I like ice cream' taken as is meant in the particular context of ME eating that Ice cream. : : So long as sense (and thought) is meant in this occourent sense, Frege can easily handle the indexical sense of I. : : Frege couldn't handle any intersubjective sense of I as he thought that sense must be objective if we are to have comon language. By objective he seems to mean that, in principle, two people can have the same sense (hence the telescope, moon example) : : He was of course wrong, as if two people have the same content of thought, it doesn't matter whether theya re called the same thought or not - they can communicate. : : Does that sound right? : Hello, : There's a search engine and local shopping website www.whatdoyouneednow.com. It's the worlds one stop shop for all your needs. : Their results are surprisingly good and provide excellent local resources in your zipcode. : Since you use the web a lot, I thought you should check out their site at <a href="http://www.whatdoyouneednow.com" title="WhatDoYouNeedNow.com">whatdoyouneednow.com</a>. : Thanks for your time! If you have any questions or comments, just ask. See ya.

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