Posted by Chris on February 26, 19103 at 05:31:56:

In Reply to: Frege's "On sense and reference" posted by Xander Ladage on February 06, 19101 at 10:22:21:

Try Dennett's 'The Origins of ytic Philosophy' chapter 7.

I don't think Frege would have agreed that there is an intersubjective charector of the word I.

Rather there is an indexical charector. Now, in an ideal language, a sense is fixed to one referent. Hence a sense always has one truth value (since referent is truth value). So indexical cases show that a sense (or thought for a sentence) cannot be a sense of eg 'I like ice cream' taken as a type of sentence, but only 'I like ice cream' taken as is meant in the particular context of ME eating that Ice cream.

So long as sense (and thought) is meant in this occourent sense, Frege can easily handle the indexical sense of I.

Frege couldn't handle any intersubjective sense of I as he thought that sense must be objective if we are to have comon language. By objective he seems to mean that, in principle, two people can have the same sense (hence the telescope, moon example)
He was of course wrong, as if two people have the same content of thought, it doesn't matter whether theya re called the same thought or not - they can communicate.

Does that sound right?

Follow Ups:

• Re: Frege's "On sense and reference" Tom 21:15:53 9/30/104 (0)
• Re: Frege's "On sense and reference" Parker 15:10:25 7/23/104 (0)
• Re: Frege's "On sense and reference" Keera 02:05:14 5/21/104 (0)

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