Author: Ollie (213.211.185.---)
Date: 12-19-05 11:40
You, my friend, are a substance dualist. Is lust in the body? Is the pain I sense when I hurt my toe in my toe? No; it is in my mind. More precisely, in my brain. But the brain is a part of the body, so yes, my pain is in the body.
When I lust, I lust not for my own body but for someone else's. The object of my lust, then, is outside my body, though it is entirely physical. When I want something, however ['Wenn ich etwas will' in German], you suggest that the object of my desire is metaphysical. This need not be so.
I do agree that there is a distinction to be made between two kinds of truth. The one posits another world beyond this one, calling this one 'the apparent world'; whereas the other contends that this world is the only true world, and that experiencing this world is to experience the truth.
The former makes a big assumption, presupposes a priori knowledge, of what 'truth' is (or ought to be): it believes that what is changing and manifold must necessarily be false, that truth can only be one, unchanging, eternal (also: infinite). This is what Nietzsche deemed a major prejudice among philosophers.
But what is philosophy? Nietzsche describes it as follows:
'Philosophy as love of wisdom, up to the wise man as the most blessed, most powerful, who justifies all becoming and wants [to have] it again, - not love of men, or of gods, or of truth, but love of a condition, a spiritual and sensual feeling of perfection: an affirmation and benediction [arising] out of an overflowing feeling of organising power. The great distinction.'
[Revaluation of All Values, book 4, section 620.]
This is why Nietzsche says elsewhere that the eternal recurrence reconciles the two most extreme modes of thought, the mechanistic and the Platonic: this world, understood as a perpetuum mobile, a self-winding clock, whose cycle repeats infinitely, is the ultimate Platonic idea: a thing-in-itself, always one, always the same - existence is this thing. And yes, as you say, existence is fluid, but the total course of this fluid is a solid, a great ring, a fixed whole.
When he adds that both are ideals, this is in full agreement with the above: the wise man idealises this world, out of an overflowing fullness, as something perfect: that is his organising [gestaltender] power - to idealise, glorify, deify.